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A was unanimously convicted by the jury and sentenced to a suspended sentence of imprisonment. The youth pleaded guilty to two counts of distribution of terrorist material, contrary to s.

The youth was 13 years of age at the time of committing the offences and 16 at the time of sentence. On 23 July police arrested the youth and found neo Nazi texts and a Nazi flag at his address.

His electronic devices where seized and following examination these revealed a collection of extreme right-wing material, chat group conversations and documents of use to a terrorist.

The youth was charged and entered guilty pleas to all offences at an early hearing and was sent for sentence under the grave crime provisions to the Central Criminal Court. The sentencing took place on 1 February The judge handed down a youth rehabilitation sentence on 8 February comprising the following elements: a. Supervision requirement for 24 months; b. Programme requirement for 20 hours to focus on counter-terrorism ; c.

Activity requirement for 15 days, and d. Prohibited activity requirement. Both Ziamani and Hockton were inmates at the prison. The attack was carefully planned and executed using a number of makeshift weapons painstakingly constructed from the limited materials available to the two men, including a homemade shank, lumps of twisted metal with fabric-covered grips and two makeshift metal stabbing implements. On the morning of 9 January both men had requested to see a nurse which gave them access to a quiet area in the prison.

Whilst there the two men asked an officer for a spoon, which were kept in a store cupboard. This was a ruse, that officer did not go into the cupboard.

Another officer then entered the area and was and was also asked for a spoon from the cupboard. This officer went to the doorway and immediately both Ziamani and Hockton attacked him from behind slashing at his head and neck with makeshift weapons.

A nurse and the first officer tried to stop the attack and were assaulted by Ziamani. The defendants were motivated to commit the attack by extremist Islamic ideology. They both wore imitation suicide belts when they carried out the attack. Writings supportive of extremist Islamic ideology were recovered from the property of both men and Ziamani carried with him during the attack a letter setting out, over four pages of handwriting, his expectation of immediate martyrdom and evincing a strong belief in violent jihad.

Ziamani pleaded guilty on 30 July to assaulting the first officer on 9 January , thereby causing actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act and assault by beating of the nurse on 9 January contrary to section 29 of the Crime and Disorder Act Ziamani and Hockton were convicted by the jury on 7 October of the attempted murder of the second officer on 9 January Hockton also pleaded guilty on 22 July to wounding another prison inmate on 8 April with intent to do him grievous bodily harm contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act The provisions of section A of the Criminal Justice Act were met.

Ziamani had a previous relevant offence listed in Schedule 15B of the Act, namely an offence contrary to section 5 Terrorism Act The Court found him to be dangerous within the meaning of the Act. The Court took into account the fact that Ziamani had served five years of an extended nineteen-year sentence for the original terrorist offence.

The Court decided that a sentence of life imprisonment was required for Hockton for the offence of attempted murder. Hockton had a previous relevant offence listed in Schedule 15B of the Act, namely an offence contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Persons Act The Court determined that Hockton was dangerous within the meaning of the Act. The Judge then took into account the fact that Hockton had served three years of a twelve-year sentence, with an earliest parole date which was two and a half years after the date of sentence.

He said that he was releasing classified information that he had accessed during his employment because he believed the UK state had failed him. He raised a number of grievances, including that the police had refused to investigate when he was subject to homophobic attacks in , that his employer had failed to address public and workplace harassment between and and that Merseyside police had subjected him to gross indignities at Bootle Police Station when he was detained for psychiatric treatment in In sum, Mr Finch believed that the UK state had caused him to suffer unwarranted harm.

The information that Mr Finch unlawfully disclosed was of the most sensitive sort. It concerned national defence and was a system that he had worked on during his employment as a software engineer. They also had to confirm their awareness of the Official Secrets Acts and that they could face prosecution if they unlawfully disclosed such information.

Mr Finch had signed undertakings of this nature. Indeed, when he sent the unauthorised disclosure in , he acknowledged that he was breaching the Official Secrets Acts. Mr Finch claimed that his disclosure was justified because it was permitted by the common law defence of necessity.

He argued that the failure of the state to redress his grievances left him with no alternative than to engage in very serious misconduct to draw attention to his position. He said that he was doing it to prevent other people having to face the same unlawful behaviour. They were heavily encrypted and Mr Finch refused to give the passcodes for them, despite admitting that they contained information relevant to his unlawful disclosure. A Crown Court judge therefore gave permission for the police to serve a notice on Mr Finch under section 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act compelling him to provide the passcodes.

Despite the notice and its consequences, Mr Finch failed to comply. For example, he had given a witness statement to the police in about one alleged assault that contained a very different account to what he said when he made his unlawful disclosure in His suggestion that it had been unfair to prosecute him in was also untenable, for the police had been informed that he had brandished a large knife in a pub.

He had also pleaded guilty to those offences in He then decided to change his plea to guilty. This sentence was then referred to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General on the basis that it was unduly lenient, and judges in the Court of Appeal increased the term to eight years. In July and August , various devices were seized. These devices were analysed. On 29 August , the defendant was arrested. On 9 December , the defendant was charged with the offences set out below:.

At a preparatory hearing at Newcastle Crown Court on 21 April the defendant entered pleas of not guilty to all counts and was conditionally bailed. Subsequently the defendant was arrested with another and charged with firearms offences and remanded into custody. On 29 May the defendant pleaded guilty to all counts on the terrorism indictment; in respect of Counts 2 and 3 this was on the basis that he was reckless as to the outcome of his actions.

This basis was accepted by the Crown. Sentencing was adjourned to follow the conclusion of the firearms trial. He returned to the UK on 1 July , whereupon he made arrangements to travel back to Syria. During the intervening nine days, he purchased equipment and clothing which would have been useful to someone intending to engage in armed combat. On 10 July , he hastily booked a single flight ticket departing from London Heathrow Airport to Bucharest that same day.

His travel plans were consistent with a route he had researched to Syria, which avoided arousing suspicion by the authorities. Despite pleas from his family, Mr Yamin did not return to the UK until May , by which time he was anticipating being arrested by the police. Upon his arrival, he was careful to ensure he was not in possession of any incriminating evidence; his mobile phone contained no data although encryption software had been installed.

Thereafter Mr Yamin resumed his university course. A journalist travelled to Atmeh, in the Idlib region of Syria, and spent a day filming Abu Suleman with a group of males who had pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. The journalist interviewed two British-speaking males, who did not reveal their names and covered their faces to avoid detection. The documentary was uploaded to YouTube. In , a university acquaintance recognised Mr Yamin as one of the males in the film wearing combat clothing, and holding a gun.

He made a speech in which he denounced the West, declared himself to be a member of Al Qaeda and said he was engaged in a violent offensive.

The film was brought to the attention of the police who commenced an investigation into the identification of the male in the footage. Visual recordings and audio material of Mr Yamin created from police encounters and open source research on the internet were submitted to experts in facial and voice comparison. Recognition evidence was also obtained from other individuals who were known to have had contact with Mr Yamin, albeit in differing circumstances.

In January , Mr Yamin was arrested. Mr Yamin continued to deny the offences until shortly before his trial in July , when he proposed a basis of plea to the first two charges, section 5 and section He accepted travelling to Syria to engage in the conflict; he admitted joining Jabhat Al Nusra and admitted being the person in the VICE News footage - albeit he denied being a member of the group for the entirety of his time abroad and maintained that he only served a limited combat role.

Consequently, his offer to plead was accepted. The Judge considered the Sentencing Guidelines and section A Criminal Justice Act and imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment as follows:.

A Notification Order for 30 years was made. On 20 April , the police received a report that a male was spraying racist graffiti on the Senedd the National Assembly building. On 20 September , the defendant was arrested. A number of posters were discovered, including copies of those which were displayed on 16 March, all of which were abusive, insulting or threatening, and stirred up hatred on the grounds of race, religion or sexual orientation.

He pleaded guilty to all charges and, on 2 December , was sentenced at Cardiff Crown Court. In her sentencing remarks, the Recorder of Cardiff stated that the defendant was an enthusiastic member of SRN, who was aware that his activities had to be done undercover, and who filmed himself with publicity in mind. The Recorder noted that it would be difficult to predict the effect that attempts at rehabilitation would have in light of the fact that the defendant continued to hold far right views, demonstrated little insight, and had the intention to commit further offences.

On 15 March Fuller received a clip of the video alleged to have been posted online by the attacker of the Mosque and Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand. This person used firearms in order to kill 51 men, women and children and placed footage of the attack on social media. At around 10pm Fuller began a rampage of violent behaviour. He left his address with a baseball bat. He attacked a house in his neighbourhood by striking the door and attacked a number of occupied vehicles that were driving on Town Lane in Stanwell.

This prompted him to return to his home address. Not content with his actions, Fuller left the broken bat at his home, changed his clothes and left the address, this time walking to the Tesco supermarket on Town Lane. He was with his friends. Fuller walked towards the vehicle openly carrying a large kitchen knife.

The male held his hand up to deflect the blow and the blade went into his hand causing significant injury. On this occasion owing solely to the quick reactions of the victim of the attack the knife that was aimed for his neck only caused a superficial injury to that location.

The victim managed to start his car and drive away from the scene of the attack. During his arrest Fuller shouted out a number of racist comments. He was charged with attempted murder, possession of a bladed article, a racially aggravated public order offence and affray.

The prosecution argued that the case against Fuller had a terrorist connection in accordance with section 30 of the Counter Terrorism Act as his action in attempting to murder the victim was an act of terrorism. Fuller appeared before the Kingston Crown Court where he entered a guilty plea to the charges. He accepted that when he attempted to murder the victim that he did so motivated by hostility towards members of racist and religious groups but he denied that his action had a terrorist connection.

Following a contested hearing the judge agreed with the prosecution. The judge found that Fuller stated that his intention was to kill a Muslim and he attempted to do this by stabbing the victim.

The judge sentenced Fuller for the offence of attempted murder on the basis that it had a terrorist connection. For attempted murder Fuller was determined to be a dangerous offender within the meaning of section A of the Criminal Justice Act As a result he received an extended sentence. He received a custodial period of 18 years and nine months' imprisonment with an extension to the sentence of five years.

The total sentence was therefore 23 years and 9 months. Fuller will not be eligible for release from this sentence until he has served two thirds of the custodial term - 18 years and nine months. Royal Barnes was convicted of seven offences of breaching his notification requirements in September He failed to provide the authorities with information about his phone numbers, email address, bank accounts and vehicle usage as required of qualifying terrorist offenders by Act of Parliament.

Section 59 is a qualifying offence and Mr Barnes was a person who, at the time, was over 16 and made subject to a qualifying custodial sentence.

The sentence meant that the notification requirements in the Counter Terrorism Act applied for a period of 15 years. The requirements obliged Mr Barnes to inform a police officer of his personal details and current circumstances within three days of his initial release from prison and then again annually. If any material change occurred then he was required to inform the police within three days. Mr Barnes complied with the initial notification obligations upon his release from prison and subsequently notified the police of two material changes in his circumstances.

The obligations were suspended in June when he was returned to custody for breaching his licence conditions but recommenced in May when he was finally released. On 16 April Mr Barnes was visited in prison by officers who informed him of new, stricter, obligations introduced by the Counter Terrorism and Border Security Act He was further reminded of the changes in writing by a probation officer.

Upon release he completed the required notification on 5 May He subsequently notified a change of address and the purchase of a vehicle. A record was made of the number and on 24 May the officer contacted Mr Barnes. Subscriber checks were completed and found that the number had been registered with Vodafone to a Blackberry handset using the same email address that Mr Barnes provided at his notification meeting on 5 May CCTV footage from the police station where the notification took place showed Mr Barnes to have two working smartphones with him.

A check with the Department for Work and Pensions also confirmed that Mr Barnes had registered this phone number with them. After his second release in May his phone was restored to him without the SIM card.

A cross network search of the handset serial number was subsequently completed and revealed that the handset had been registered on the H3G network using the telephone number ending On 31 July Mr Barnes was involved in an incident in Ilford. He made an emergency call to report the matter using phone number During the course of the call he also gave his name. Enquiries with Royal Bank of Scotland confirmed that Mr Barnes had the NatWest account but also uncovered ownership of another account.

Customer profile details for this further account were obtained which indicated that Mr Barnes updated his personal details with them on 13 May He gave his email address as moneyman [server details redacted]. The claim was closed from 6 July due to the level of his earnings. The online application was made in the name of Royal Barnes.

A check was conducted which showed that, whilst Mr Barnes was not the registered keeper, he was the only person insured to drive the vehicle. He was searched and in his wallet was found a Monzo Bank card and a Starling Bank card, each in the name of Royal Barnes. Mr Barnes was arrested, cautioned by the police and interviewed.

He initially denied ownership of the Blackberry phone and associated number ending but subsequently admitted he had been given it by a friend. He also admitted ownership and use of the number ending , three bank accounts, the email address and Astra vehicle. It was pointed out by the police that he had spoken to them on four separate occasions since his release from prison but had failed to register any of this information.

Mr Barnes entered guilty pleas to each of the offences. On 14 August Salih Khater carried out a premeditated and deliberate attack on civilians and police officers near Parliament Square.

His weapon was his car. First, he drove at cyclists waiting at traffic lights; then he drove at police officers who were guarding the side entrance to the Palace of Westminster. His actions were not a mistake or a result of some mechanical error. They were calculated to cause maximum death and injury. He caused widespread fear and chaos but miraculously did not kill anyone. He was convicted of two counts of attempted murder and sentenced, in October , to life imprisonment with a minimum custodial term of 15 years.

Salih Khater was born on 26 January in Darfur, Sudan. When he got to the UK he made an application for asylum. He said in his application that he had been involved with a Sudanese political organisation called the Justice and Equality Movement. He also alleged that he had been tortured by the Sudanese authorities and that his life would be in danger if he was ever to return. Leave to remain was granted by the UK authorities on 26 July On Monday 13 August he travelled from Birmingham where he was living to Peterborough to apply for a UK passport through the fast-track scheme.

He was informed that the passport application that he had submitted was his first as an adult in the UK and so he was not eligible for the fast-track scheme. He arrived into London at about hrs on 14 August He was to drive around Westminster and past Downing Street during the course of his scene reconnaissance.

Mr Khater arrived, for the first time, into Parliament Square just before on 14 August. He drove out of Parliament Square and over Westminster Bridge before performing a U-turn on the south side of the river and driving back to Parliament Square. From there he drove around the Square and into Whitehall, past 10 Downing Street. It seemed that he was scouting the area, for his subsequent actions required considerable familiarity with the road layout. He parked on Windmill Street, where his car remained stationary with him inside for four-and-a-half hours.

He then travelled back to Parliament Square but the area was then very quiet. Mr Khater drove past the location where he would later commit the attack, at normal speed and on the correct side of the road. He then stopped in Great Peter Street, got out and walked to the junction with Millbank; it seemed that he was sizing up his target.

He then returned to his car and waited. When he eventually drove back past Parliament the two police officers who he was later to try to kill were just arriving for work, pulling on their high-visibility jackets.

Mr Khater drove out of Parliament Square and down towards St. Once he was half way along, he made a U-turn and drove back towards Parliament Square. For a third time, he drove past the location of the attack and drove along to Great Peter Street again.

If not before, he would on this occasion have seen the two police officers in high visibility jackets. He then turned off in a different direction before returning to the Square. He then conducted three laps before attacking. Mr Khater timed his attack in order to ensure the maximum number of cyclists were waiting at the lights at the junction of St. It would have been obvious to anyone that this was not the correct way to turn, especially to Mr Khater who had driven correctly on the left-hand side of the road on two occasions in the previous hour.

He caused chaos and injury; witnesses at the junction described the vehicle as revving towards them, driven in a calm yet determined manner. He then accelerated away from the chaos but veered down a narrow chute by the side of the main road towards the police officers. It was only their swift actions in jumping out of the way that saved them from serious injury or death.

Mr Khater was questioned at the roadside. He indicated that he was acting alone. During the trial he said that he travelled to London in order to visit the Sudanese embassy; he wanted to obtain travel documents to return there and visit his family. However, the jury convicted him of two offences of attempted murder, one in relation to the cyclists and one in relation to the police officers.

The judge imposed a sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 15 years. They were sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment suspended for 12 months, together with a year notification requirement.

Sally Lane, 56, and John Letts, 58, were each charged with three offences of entering into a funding arrangements connected with terrorism. He denied this was his intention to his parents.

In September he went to Daesh-controlled areas in Syria. During the period and , when Sally and John Letts were aware that Jack was in Syria, and knew or had reasonable cause to suspect that any money they sent, via circuitous routes, would or may be used for the purposes of terrorism, they sent or attempted to send him money.

They knew or had reasonable cause to suspect because of information available to them from their own communications with Jack, social media, what they were told by the police and also experts in radicalisation. Evidence from witnesses and messages exchanged by Jack and his parents showed they knew he held violent, extremist views before they sent him the money. This included a message Jack posted on Facebook in July in response to a photo of a former school friend standing alongside other soldiers after completing a British army training course.

John Letts and Sally Lane were warned by the police that they should not transfer money to Jack as doing so could mean they were breaking the law. Their defence was that they trusted their son when he told them he was acting as a translator and a civil administrator for Daesh.

They did not support Daesh, its aims or methods. Omar Ashfaq pleaded guilty to eight offences of dissemination of a terrorist publication contrary to section 2 of the Terrorism Act and three offences of having in his possession information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, contrary to section 58 Terrorism Act He would arrive at the mosque and whilst worshippers were at prayer he would place the USB sticks in their shoes.

Fortunately, CCTV was present in a number of the targeted mosques that had been and information was passed to the police that led to the identification of the defendant. Ashfaq was arrested and a search was carried out at his address. Also, a number of devices such as a lap top and a smart phone were seized and interrogated and found to contain the same material.

The material included audio files of speeches from Anwar Al-Awlaki, a radical preacher and supporter of Al-Qaeda who encourages violent and non-violent jihad. Related Apps Standoff 2. Garena Free Fire — Winterlands. Real Gangster Crime. Mad GunZ - Battle Royale, online, shooting games.